One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all.
In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck.
All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.In this beautifully written book, Duncan Pritchard provides a distinctive defence of a neo-Moorean safety response to scepticism. At the heart of the book is a sensitive and subtle discussion of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. He distinguishes two central kinds of luck which are epistemically relevant and uses them to provide an insightful critique of contemporary virtue epistemology... Pritchard's admirably clear prose will provide students with an overview of debates at the heart of contemporary epistemology while also making a substantial contribution to those debates. Epistemic Luck will surely be widely read and influential.
